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RECENT CASES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS-REFUSAL TO
ANSWER RELEVANT QUESTIONS AS A BASIS FOR
DISMISSAL FROM EMPLOYMENT DESPITE INVOCATION
OF FIFTH AMENDMENT
In a hearing before the Commissioner of Investigation of the City
of New York, appellant refused to state whether he was then a member
of the Communist Party and based his refusal to answer on the fifth
amendment to the United States Constitution. He was thereafter discharged as an employee of the New York Transit Authority pursuant
to provisions of the New York Security Risk Law' which allows dismissal of employees of security agencies who are found to be of
"doubtful trust and reliability." Without seeking administrative
remedies, appellant brought a proceeding in the state court for reinstatement contending that the finding was based solely upon his use
of the fifth amendment, thus depriving him of due process. The trial
court dismissed the proceeding and the United States Supreme Court,
treating the appeal as a petition for certiorari, 2 affirmed. A dismissal
from employment based on a refusal to answer questions relevant to
employment does not violate due process, and this is so although the
refusal is accompanied by the invocation of the fifth amendment. Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468 (1958).
State and lower federal courts have generally held that a refusal
to answer questions relating to employment or a refusal to waive immunity-in investigations conducted by authorized bodies is a ground
for dismissal of a public officer or employee. 3 Usually, these results
have been reached by concluding that the refusal to answer constitu1. N.Y. UNcoNsoL. LAWS §§ 1101-08 (McKinney Supp. 1958). Section 1105
provides that any authorized
[P]ublic officer, board, body or commission

. . . may

. . . suspend

without pay any officer or employee under his or its appointive jurisdiction occupying a security position or a position in a security agency whenever such officer, board, body or commission shall find, after proper
investigation and inquiry, that, upon all the evidence, reasonable grounds
exist for belief that, because of doubtful trust and reliability, the employment of such person in such position would endanger the security or defense of the nation and the state.
2. The appeal was dismissed and certiorari was granted since the constitutional questions before the court related primarily to conclusions made by
appellees rather than to the validity of the provisions of the state law.
3. See, e.g., Steinmetz v. California State Bd. of Educ., 44 Cal. 2d 816, 285
P.2d 617 (1955); Drury v. Hurley, 339 Ill. App. 33, 88 N.E.2d 728 (1949);
Faxon v. School Comm., 331 Mass. 531, 120 N.E.2d 772 (1954); Laba v. Newark
Bd. of Educ., 23 N.J. 364, 129 A.2d 273 (1957); Souder v. City of Philadelphia,
305 Pa. 1, 156 Atl. 245 (1931); Annot., 44 A.L.R.2d 789, 790 (1955). Cf. Davis
v. Univ. of Kansas City, 129 F. Supp. 716 (W.D. Mo. 1955).
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tes insubordination, 4 conduct unbecoming the employment,5 or some
other "just cause" 6 under an applicable statute. 7 The Supreme Court
of the United States has never expressly ruled that an inference of
unsuitability can be drawn from a refusal to answer such questions,8
but in Garner v. Board of Public Works,9 the Court upheld the right
of a state to inquire as to past Communist Party membership and permitted a dismissal of employees who refused requested information.
In a later case, however, the Court held that a dismissal could not be
based on a refusal to take a loyalty oath which was arbitrary in appli-cation and which would have allowed dismissal without regard to innocent membership.' 0 This adversity to arbitrary dismissal was reiterated in Slochower v. Board of Higher Education" where the Court
struck down as violating due process a dismissal of a college professor
who had been discharged solely for having invoked the fifth amendment in a congressional inquiry. In the Slochower case, the Court took
the opportunity to again condemn the popular view of recent years
that one who invokes the fifth amendment is either a criminal or a
perjurer, 2 but indicated that there may be instances in which a resort to the privilege against self-incrimination may be grounds for dismissal if the privilege is invoked in answer to questions relevant to
13
employment.
The instant case is not contrary to the Slochower holding but rather
demonstrates its narrow scope. The Court points out that an automatic
and arbitrary dismissal stemming solely from the use of the fifth
amendment was here avoided by basing the conclusion of "doubtful trust and reliability" upon lack of candor concerning matters determining qualifications and fitness for employment. The fifth amendment was actually not available to the appellant in the state proceeding,14 but the Court indicates that even if it were the results might be
the same. In effect, the Court is equating the invocation of the fifth
amendment with a refusal to answer; and, consequently, there are no
4. Steinmetz v. California State Bd. of Educ., 44 Cal. 2d 816, 285 P.2d 617
(1955).

5. Souder v. City of Philadelphia, 305 Pa. 1, 156 Ati. 245 (1931).
6. Faxon v. School Comm., 331 Mass. 531, 120 N.E.2d 772 (1954).
7. E.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 1028.1 (1958); MAss. AN. LAWS c. 71 § 42 (Supp.
1957); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18:13-17 (Supp. 1957); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 111122 (Supp. 1957).
8. But see, Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1956), where the Court
held that unfavorable inferences of moral character were impermissibly
drawn from a refusal to answer.
9. 341 U.S. 716 (1951).

10. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
11. 350 U.S. 551 (1956), 10 VAND. L. REV.139 (1956).
12. See Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 442 (1956). For a discussion
on drawing inferences from the use of the fifth amendment in civil suits, see
Comment, 4 CATHOLic U.L. REV.51 (1954) and Note, 34 NEB. L. REV. 88 (1955).
13. See 10 VAND.L.REV.139 (1957).
14. Cf. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947); Twining v. New Jersey,
211 U.S.78 (1908).
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inferences drawn from the use, per se, of the privilege against selfincrimination. Here, as in Beilan v. Board of Public Education,15 a
similar case decided the same day, the dismissal was not necessarily
predicated on disloyalty. 16 On the contrary, the Court indicates in
both cases that the conclusions resulting in the dismissals could have
been justifiably reached from a refusal to answer any question reasonably related to the employee's ability or integrity.
The decision in this case, and that of the Beilan case, emphasizes that
due process will not be violated so long as the conclusions resulting in
the dismissal are not arbitrarily or mechanically reached from the
mere use of a constitutional privilege. The decision in no way defeats
the purpose of the fifth amendment which is to protect a person from
being compelled to give evidence which may be used against him in
a criminal proceeding. 17 In effect, governmental bodies are now given
rights more on a level with private employers in discharging employees and are not hindered from making determinations resulting
in dismissals by the employees' use of the fifth amendment. The decision appears just since it makes no demands on a government employee to which a private employee is not subject. Further, national
security is promoted without necessarily detracting from individual
rights and fundemental freedoms.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREEDOM OF SPEECHUNCONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON FREE SPEECH BY
STATE TAX EXEMPTION PROCEDURES
The California constitution provided that no person or organization advocating the violent or otherwise unlawful overthrow of the
state or national government would be entitled to a tax exemption.'
A statute implementing this provision required the signing of a declaration of non-advocacy of such a doctrine as a prerequisite to
qualification for property tax exemptions. 2 Appellants claimed such
exemptions as members of groups entitled to apply therefor, but the
exemptions were denied because of their refusal to sign the non-advocacy oath on the tax form. On appeal from judgments upholding
15. 357 U.S. 399 (1958). The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of a
school teacher on grounds of incompetency for refusal to answer questions
concerning Communist Party affiliation asked by the school superintendent.
The dismissal was not based upon an inference that the teacher was a Communist Party member but that refusal to answer relevant questions pertaining to his fitness as a teacher was a deliberate and insurbordinate act from
which incompetency would be concluded.
16. See concurring opinion of Frankfurter, J., 357 U.S. at 410 (1958).
17. See GluswoLD, THE FIFTH AmENDMENT TODAY 2 (1955); MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 252 (1954); 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2250 (3d ed. 1940).
1. CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 19.
2. CAL. REV. & TAx. CODE § 32 (1957).
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the denial of the exemptions and the constitutionality of the statute,
held, reversed. A statute which requires claimants of tax exemptions
to sign a non-advocacy oath as a prerequisite to such exemptions effects
a denial of free speech without due process of law where the procedure
for attacking the determination of the tax assessor places the burden
of proof on the exemption claimants to show themselves without the
non-exempt class. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958); First Unitarian Church v. County of Los Angeles, 357 U.S. 545 (1958).
That provision of the first amendment of the federal constitution prohibiting the abridgment of free speech by Congress has b6en held to
apply to the states by virtue of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.3 The right thus guaranteed, however, is not an
absolute one, and there are situations in which the interest of the state
is such that freedom of speech may be restricted without violating substantive due process. 4 In tax exemption cases the burden of proof may
ordinarily be placed on the taxpayer to show that he is entitled to the
exemption, 5 but the Supreme Court has declared a summary tax
collection procedure a violation of procedural due process when the
tax imposed was shown to be a penalty for a crime.6
In the instant case the Supreme Court reasons that the denial of the
exemption had the effect of penalizing the claimants for certain kinds
of speech, the deterrent effect being the same as if a fine had been
imposed for such speech7 According to the majority opinion, a case
involving the loss of free speech is the same as a case involving loss of
liberty in that the burden of proof must be borne by the party seeking
to restrict the speech. The Court assumed without deciding that a
state may deny tax exemptions to persons who engage in proscribed
speech for which they might be criminally liable. But the California
3. "In a series of decisions beginning with Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652 (1925), this Court held that the liberty of speech and of the press which

the First Amendment guarantees against abridgment by the federal government is within the liberty safeguarded by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by state action. That principle has been
followed and reaffirmed to the present day." Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495,
500-01 (1952). See, e.g., Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S.
697 (1931).
4. E.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (use of sound truck); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (name-calling in public place);
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (criminal syndicalism); Gitlow v.
New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (criminal anarchy). Cf. Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339
U.S. 382 (1950).
5. E.g., Brown v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 193 (1933); Phillips v. Dime Trust Co.,
284 U.S. 160 (1931); Green v. Pederson, 99 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 1958); Coyne Elec.
School v. Paschen, 12 Ill.2d 387, 146 N.E.2d 73 (1957); State Tax Comm'n v.
Blinder, 147 N.E.2d 796 (Mass. 1958); Iota Benefit Ass'n v. County of Douglas,
165 Neb. 330, 85 N.W.2d 726 (1958); In re McKinnon's Estate, 319 P.2d 579
(Ore. 1957).
6. Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557 (1922).
7. 357 U.S. at 518
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exemption statute was interpreted to mean that the failure to sign
the affidavit was not conclusive evidence that the claimants should be
denied the exemptions. The procedure for attacking the tax assessor's
action when a claimed exemption was denied put the burden of proof
on the claimants to show that they should not be denied the exemptions. The Court held that this mehod of enforcing the provisions of
the statute was a violation of due process. Therefore, persons claiming
the exemptions could not be required to execute the declaration either
as a condition precedent to obtaining the tax exemption or to the tax
assessor's proceeding further to determine whether claimants were
entitled to the exemption.
In sum, the result in this case is reached by holding that the claimant's constitutional rights are violated because the burden of proof
has been placed upon them to show that they do not engage in criminal
advocacy. This reasoning may be attacked on the ground that the
question of burden of proof is not at all relevant here. The California
law provides that a claimant must do two things before his claim of
exemption will be entertained: first, he must show that he is a member
of a specified group, and second, he must sign the non-advocacy affidavit.8 Until the claimant does these things he has made no proper claim
of exemption-no question has been raised as to whether or not he is
eligible. The situation is analogous to that in an ordinary suit at law.
There is no queston here of burden of proof until a proper claim has
been filed and an issue of fact to claimant's eligibility has been raised.
Even if burden of proof were the pivotal point in the case, however,
the result would still seem questionable. A tax exemption is a privilege
granted by the state. To declare that it is violative of constitutional
rights to require those who seek a privilege to bear the burden of
proving eligibility for that privilege seems an undue stretching of
constitutional protections.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREEDOM OF TRAVELINABILITY OF SECRETARY OF STATE TO WITHHOLD
PASSPORTS BECAUSE OF BELIEFS AND
ASSOCIATIONS OF APPLICANTS
Petitioners sought a declaration that they were entitled to passports

after their applications had been denied by the Secretary of State on
8. The California constitution describes certain persons and organizations

which may be allowed property tax exemptions. CAL. CONST. art. 13, §§
134, 1 . It also limits the exemptions to those who do not advocate the unlawful overthrow of the government. CAL. CONST. art. 20, § 19. Implementing
this provision, the California Code provides that "If any such statement, return, or other document does not contain such declaration, the person or
organization ... shall not receive any exemption .... " CAL. REv. & TAX.
CoDE§ 32 (1957).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 12

the grounds that they had communistic backgrounds and had refused
to submit affidavits as to their present membership in the Communist
Party. The district court granted summary judgment for respondent.
On certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States, held, reversed (5-4 decision). Absent explicit congressional provision, the
Secretary of State has no authority to withhold passports from citizens
because of their beliefs or associations. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116
(1958).'
The traditional purpose of a passport has been to aid the bearer
in passing freely and safely through foreign lands. 2 With the exception
of certain wartime periods, 3 a passport has not been required of United
States citizens for entrance or exit purposes until recent years.4 During these periods of non-requirement, it was generally understood that
the Secretary of State had wide discretion in determining whether
he would issue a passport 5 and this view was strengthened by statutory language authorizing the Secretary to issue passports., However,
there have been indications that this discretionary power was not
absolute. 7 When the President in 1953 invoked by proclamation 8 the
1. See also Dayton v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 144 (1958).

There, belief that the

citizen was going abroad to engage in activities that would advance the Communist cause was held an insufficient reason for refusing to issue a passport.
This case and the instant case were also discussed in Note, 47 GEO. L.J. 142
(1958).
2. Urtetiqui v. D'Arcy, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 692, 698 (1835).
3. The necessity for regulating travel across the national borders in time
of war gave rise to considerable legislation requiring a passport for entrance
and exit. The first statute was passed near the end of the War of 1812, Act
of Feb. 4, 1815, ch. 31, § 10, 3 Stat. 195, and expired with the cessation of
hostilities. The next statute, Act of May 22, 1918, ch. 81, § 2, 40 Stat. 559, gave
the President the power to require a passport for citizens during wartime and
was implemented for a time by Presidential Proclamation of Aug. 8, 1918,
40 Stat. 1829. This act was amended by the Act of June 21, 1941, ch. 210, 55
Stat. 252, to include national emergencies and was implemented by Proc. 2523,
55 Stat. 1696 (1941). The basis of restriction on foreign travel is now the
Immigration and Nationality Act § 215(b), 66 Stat. 163, 8 U.S.C. § 1185(b)
(1952), but the 1941 statute was twice extended, the first extension being by
Joint Resolution of July 3, 1952, ch. 570, § 30, 66 Stat. 333, and including the
period involved in the instant case. In addition to action taken under statutory authority, there was some purely administrative action, Kent v. Dulles,
357 U.S. 116, 123 (1958), citing U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, THE AMERICAN PASSPORT
50 (1898).
4. A survey made of thirty-seven countries revealed that only ten allowed
their nationals to leave the country without a passport. The same survey also
revealed that only five of the thirty-seven would allow United States citizens
to enter without a passport. Note, Passport Refusals for Political Reasons,
61 YALE L.J. 171, n.3 (1952).
5. Miller v. Sinjen, 289 Fed. 388, 394 (8th Cir. 1923); 13 OPs. ATT'Y GEN.
89, 92 (1869); HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 268 (1942).

6. The initial statute, Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 127, § 23, 11 Stat. 52, stated
that the Secretary "shall be authorized to grant and issue passports . . ." and
this was amended to "may grant and issue passports . . ." by 44 Stat. 887
(1926), 22 U.S.C. § 211a (1952). See also Exec. Order No. 7856, 3 Fed. Reg. 799
(1938), in which detailed regulations are set out.
7. See, e.g., Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325 (1939).
8. Proc. 3004, 67 Stat. C31 (1953) following Proc. 2914, 64 Stat. A454, (1950).
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statutory 9 power authorizing him to require a passport for entrance
and exit during national emergencies, the scope of the Secretary's discretion suddenly became a problem of active interest. The first of a
series of cases attacking this discretionary power, Bauer v. Acheson, 0
was decided in 1952, prior to the presidential proclamation. Bauer and
subsequent cases" emphasized the necessity for reasonable administrative hearings and the necessity of exhausting administrative remedies before seeking the aid of the courts.1 2 Only one case was
decided on the basis of the substantive reason for refusing a passport 3
and it was not until the instant case that this issue had come before
the Supreme Court for a final determination.
In holding the present reasons for refusal insufficient, the instant
decision leaves the Secretary essentially no discretion as to substantive
grounds for the refusal of an application. The language of the opinion
indicates that the only grounds for refusal that the Court at present
considers valid are those relating to citizenship or criminal or unlawful
conduct. 14 The Court further indicates that any attempt to limit an
individual's right to travel will be subject to close judicial scrutiny,
with all doubts of statutory meaning resolved in favor of the individual. 15 Any other reason for refusal would probably have to be,authorized by specific statutory language. 6 Further, since the opinion speaks
of a constitutional right, there remains some doubt as to the validity
of refusals other than on traditional grounds, even though specifically
7
authorized by Congress.'
This case represents another clash between individual rights and the
interest in national security. On the one hand is the citizen's right
to travel, which has found expression in documents from Magna
Charta to the United Nation's Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.' 8 This right is based, at least in part, upon the personal interest
in freedom of movement and upon the community interest in allowing
9. Immigration and Nationality Act § 215, 66 Stat. 163, 8 U.S.C. 1185 (1952).
10. 106 F. Supp. 445 (D.D.C. 1952).
11. See, e.g., Boudin v. Dulles, 235 F.2d 532 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
12. Robeson v. Dulles, 235 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
13. Schachtman v. Dulles, 225 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1955). Membership in an

organization listed by the Attorney General as subversive was held insufficient
grounds for refusing a passport where subversive nature of the organization
was denied.

14. "[C]itizenship or allegiance . . . or unlawful conduct . . . are the only

ones which it could fairly be argued were adopted by Congress .
at 128.

"

357 U.S.

15. '"Where activities . . . such as travel, are involved, we will construe

narrowly all delegated powers that curtail or dilute them." Id. at 129.
16. "Congress has made no such provision in explicit terms; and absent
one, the Secretary may not employ that standard to restrict the citizens' right
of free movement." Id. at 130.
17. Ibid.
18. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 13, para. 2, YEARBOOK OF
THE UNITED NATIONS 535

(1948-49).
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citizens to "see for themselves" and to seek knowledge wherever it
may be found.19 On the other hand there is the necessity for preventing members of subversive groups from passing freely in and out of
the country on their missions.20 As pointed out in the dissent, the
period during which petitioner's passport was refused was not really
peacetime' and the legislature had already indicated that in such
situations the individual right might have to be limited in the interest
of national security~2 This decision in favor of the individual's interest
may foretell other judicial restrictions on the Secretary's discretion
and an eventual legislative reaction which will probably face a test
of constitutionality.2

CORPORATIONS-CORPORATE EXECUTIVES'
STOCK OPTION PLAN
Minority stockholders brought a derivative action against the directors and an officer of a corporation alleging that a stock option plan'
and certain other transactions 2 constituted waste of corporate assets
19. 357 U.S. at 126.
20. Id. at 132.
21. "In a wholly realistic sense there is no peace today, and there was no
peace in 1952." Id. at 141.
22. Id. at 132.
23. The President in a message to Congress, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws,
85th Cong., 2d Sess., 2713 (1958), asked Congress to pass a bill returning the
Secretary's discretionary power in regard to issuing passports and to safeguard
the discretionary power to put certain countries off limits to American citizens.
The Senate bill, S. 4110, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), failed to get Senate approval but the House bill, H.R. 13760, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), did receive
House approval August 23, 1958.
1. Options were exercisable 20% on or after May 1, 1951, and 20% on the
option dates in 1952, 1953, 1954 and 1955. If the net income of the company
fell below an amount equal to $3.50 per share of the common stock outstanding at the end of the calendar years 1951, 1952, 1953, or 1954, the option was
revoked as to the number of additional shares otherwise becoming available
for purchase by each participant. The purchase price was $36.125 per share,
the fair market value of the stock on January 9, 1951, the date of the grant.
The options were not transferable otherwise than by will or the laws of
descent and distribution, and could only be exercised by the optionee during
his lifetime. If the optionee left the company during the years 1951, 1952,

1953, or 1954, for each full month of employment he was entitled to exercise
the options with respect to 1/12 of the entire number of shares to become
available to him during the following calendar year. Options had to be exercised within three months after leaving the company's employ. As a condition subsequent to validity the plan had to receive shareholder ratification.
The options expired December 31, 1957.
2. Waste of the corporate assets was alleged in four separate causes of
action. The first cause of action, lack of consideration for the options, is the
subject of this comment. The second and third causes of action concerned the
company's payment of $20,000 to a resigning officer for that officer's option to
3,000 shares (worth only $9,000 to the optionee). The court said that in the
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in that the corporation received no consideration for the options from
the employee-optionees, nor could it reasonably expect to benefit
from the plan. The options were exercisable in installments, and although a participant could exercise 26 2/3 per cent of his option within four months of the grant, the option could not be exercised in toto
until four years later. Held, summary judgment for defendents. An
executive stock option plan is supported by sufficient consideration and
does not constitute a waste or gift of corporate assets where the rights
granted a participant are conditioned upon further rendition of his
services. Gruber v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 158 F.Supp. 593 (N.D. Ohio
1958).
Restricted stock options 3 are currently a popular means of management compensation in public issue corporations. 4 Under such plans
key executives are given an opportunity to buy stock of the corporation in the future at or slightly below the market price on the date of
the grant. The corporation expects to benefit by providing its competent executives with an incentive that will ultimately result in higher
corporate earnings through more efficient management. For a plan to
be valid the corporation must receive legal consideration from the
optionee, 5 and there must be a reasonable relationship between the
absense of usurpation, fraud, or gross negligence, it would not interfere

merely to overrule and control discretion of directors on questions of corporate
management, policy, or business. The court held that the fourth cause of
action, an amendment to the president's employment contract, was a matter
within the discretion of the directors concerning internal affairs of the corporation.
3. "Restricted" in that they must comply with the applicable provisions
of the Internal Revenue Code to receive favorable tax treatment. INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, § 421. The Securities Act of 1933 also contains provisions relating to stock option plans. 48 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§
77b-v (Supp. IV, 1957). Provisions of state statutes must also be complied
with. These problems are beyond the scope of this comment. See generally,
WASHINGTON & ROTHScHILD, COMPENSATING THE CORPORATE EXECUTIVE (rev.
ed. 1951); Dean, Employee Stock Options, 66 HARv. L. REV. 1403 (1953); Grossman and Herzel, Employee Stock Options, 1958 U. ILL. L.F. 45.

4. Stock options have not found wide use in closely held corporations be-

cause of restrictions on 10% owners. On the use of stock options as incentive

compensation in closely held corporations see 2

O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS:

:12 (1958).
5. Otherwise the option is considered a gift of corporate assets regardless
of majority shareholder ratification. Holthusen v. Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co.,
53 F. Supp. 488 (E.D. Pa. 1943); Frankel v. Donovan, 120 A.2d 311 (Del. Ch.
1956); Kerbs v. California Eastern Airways, Inc., 33 Del. Ch. 69, 90 A.2d 652
(Sup. Ct. 1952), 34 A.L.R.2d 839 (1954). But see, Clamitz v. Thatcher Mfg. Co.,
158 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1947) regarding plaintiff's contention that the option
could be exercised at any time after they were granted, the court said that
whether or not such a condition would have helped or hurt the incentive
features of the arrangement was a business problem for the directors to
solve; McPhail v. L.S. Starrett Co., 257 F.2d 388 (1st Cir. 1958), affirming,
157 F. Supp. 560 (D. Mass. 1957), holding that options which all employees
with more than six months service could purchase within a thirty-day period
at a price equal to the fair market value at the time of the grant need not
be supported by consideration because the options were only offers which
the optionor could revoke at any time before acceptance. The optionees were

LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 8:11-
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value of the option granted and the anticipated benefit to the corporation.6 Difficulty arises in determining reasonableness, 7 and the courts
have not been inclined to substitute their judgment for that of the
corporation's directors in the absence of bad faith or fraud. 8 Retention
of key employees is the basic objective of executive option plans,9 and
assurance that the optionee will remain in employment for a specified
length of time is ordinarily the legal consideration for the option.' 0
Options which were exercisable immediately from the date of issuance
have been held invalid for lack of consideration," however, an option exercisable in one year has been held valid.12 Past services do
not normally constitute consideration, 3 but exceptions have been
made.14 Merely increasing an optionee's proprietary interest in the
given ten years to pay for thd stock without being charged interest, however
upon termination of employment an optionee's right to pay for his stock in
installments without interest terminated. The court felt that the plan offered
a reasonable assurance that participants would continue in the company's
employ: "[Tihe fact remains that the Company could reasonably expect to
receive as consideration for the options not only the increased loyalty and
effort of its employees but also that its employees who were given options
would stay on in their employment to take advantage of the privilege of paying
for their stock in installments without interest." 257 F.2d at 394.
6. Sandler v. Schenley Industries, Inc., 32 Del. Ch. 46, 79 A.2d 606 (Ch.
1951); Rosenthal v. Burry Biscuit Corp., 30 Del. Ch. 299, 60 A.2d 106 (Ch.
1948). Absent such a relationship the plan is open to attack by minority
shareholders even though a majority of the shareholders have ratified the
plan. Cf. Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582 (1933).
7. See Rogers v. Hill 289 U.S. 582 (1933); Clamitz v. Thatcher Mfg. Co.,
158 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1947); Wyles v. Campbell, 77 F. Supp. 343 (D.Del. 1948);
Holthusen v. Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co., 52 F. Supp. 125 (E.D. Pa. 1943);
Rosenthal v. Burry Biscuit Corp., 30 Del. Ch. 299, 60 A.2d 106 (1948); Heller
v. Boylan, 29 N.Y.S.2d 653 (Sup. Ct.), affd mem., 263 App. Div. 815, 32 N.Y.S.2d
131 (Sup. Ct., App. T. 1941).
8. Wright v. Heublein, 238 Fed. 321 (4th Cir. 1916); Wyles v. Campbell, 77
F. Supp. 343 (D.Del. 1948); McQuillen v. National Cash Register Co., 27 F.
Supp. 639 (D. Md. 1939). BALLENTINE, CORPORATIONS § 76 (rev. ed. 1946).
9. "Sufficient consideration to the corporation may be, inter alia, the
retention of the services of an employee, or the gaining of the services of a
new employee .... ." Kerbs v. California Eastern Airways Inc., 33 Del. Ch.
69, 90 A.2d 652, 656 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
10. Retention can be assured by an employment contract entered into at
the time of the grant, or by the terms of the option itself. McPhail v. L. S.
Starrett Co., 257 F.2d 388 (1st Cir. 1958) (benefit to corporation implied in
terms of option); Holthusen v. Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co., 53 F. Supp. 488 (E.D.
Pa. 1943); Sandler v. Schenley Industries, Inc., 32 Del. Ch. 46, 79 A.2d 606
(Ch. 1951) (contract).
11. Kerbs v. California Eastern Airways, Inc., 33 Del. Ch. 69, 90 A.2d 652
(Sup. Ct. 1952); Frankel v. Donovan, 120. A.2d 311, (Del. Ch. 1956).
12. Holthusen v. Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co., 53 F. Supp. 488 (E.D. Pa.
1953).
13. Accord, In re Fergus Falls Wollen Mills Co., 127 F.2d 491 (8th Cir.
1942); Richardson v. Blue Grass Mining Co., 29 F. Supp. 658 (E.D. Ky. 1939),
aff'd, 127 F.2d 291 (6th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 639 (1942);
Von Arnim v. American Tubeworks, 188 Mass. 515, 74 N.E. 680 (1905).
14. Hurt v. Cotton States Fertilizer Co., 159 F.2d 52, 59 (5th Cr.), cert. denied, 331 U.S 828 (1947) (employee's services of sufficient merit to warrant a
reasonable retroactive bonus); Vaught v. Charleston Nat'l Bank, 62 F.2d 817,
820 (10th Cir. 1933) (consideration present where employee took on duties
other than those for which he was compensated).
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15
corporation does not assure the corporation of receiving any benefit
and therefore would constitute a gift of corporate assets.
In the instant case the court disposed of the plaintiffs' contention
that ther.e was lack of consideration running to the corporation by
pointing out that the plan required rendition of services after the
date of adoption as a condition to participation.' 6 Plaintiffs emphasized
the fact that a participant could have served his employment on the
first option date 17 and still have exercised up to 26 2/3 per cent of his
total allocation. They felt that consideration for this part of the option
was weak, thus implying that there was not a reasonable relationship between the value of the option and the benefit to the corporation.
Plaintiffs cited Holthusen v. Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co. 18 in support
of their contentions. In prior litigation between the parties in the Budd
case' 9 the court enjoined issuance of options that were exercisable in
toto immediately after the grant on the ground that the only consideration was the hope of retaining the employees. The injunction was dissolved when the plan was subsequently amended to provide that the
options were not exercisable until after one year of employment. 20
The court in the instant case stressed the fact that here the options
were not exercisable in toto until four years after the grant.2 ' The
court also ascribed importance to the fact that continued business success was necessary for the plan to operate and reasoned that this
provision of the plan further insured the corporation of receiving a
benefit.22
The holding in the instant case is in accord with the generally recognized requisites of valid stock option plans.23 However, it provides
little guidance for a determination of what is a reasonable relationship
between the value of the option granted and the anticipated benefit to

15. Rosenthal v. Burry Biscuit Corp., 30 Del. Ch. 299, 60 A.2d 106 (Ch.

1948).

16. "Consideration for the options is inherent in the plan itself because the
optionee is unable to exercise his option unless he first renders service to the
company." 158 F. Supp. at 599.
17. May 1, 1951. See note 1 supra.
18. 53 F. Supp. 488 (E.D. Pa. 1943).

19. Holthusen v. Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co., 52 F. Supp. 125 (E.D. Pa. 1943).
20. Holthusen v. Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co., 53 F. Supp. 488 (E.D. Pa. 1943).
21. "How much more reasonable is the C & 0 plan herein where the participants are unable to exercise their options at all unless they work at least
4 months for 26 2/3% and then must work for 4 years to exercise fully their
options to the remaining 73 1/3%." 158 F. Supp. at 600.
22. "To insure further that the C & 0 would receive a 'benefit' the plan
imposes a requirement not included in plans of other corporations that have
been involved in litigation through shareholder suits. As a condition precedent
to the right to exercise options maturing in each of the years from 1952
through 1955, the C & O's net income must be at least equal to $3.50 per share
of common stock for each preceding year." 158 F. Supp. at 599.
23. The corporation must receive legal consideration from the optionee and
the plan must be so designed as to reasonably assure the corporation that it
will receive the benefit bargained for.
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24
The protection furnished by the requirement of conthe corporation.m
tinued business success 25 is illusory since a participant will not exercise
his option unless the corporation has prospered and the stock has in
fact appreciated in value. The requirement of legal consideration for
the grant of a stock option should be re-examined. McPhail v. L. S.
Starrett Co. 26 is apparently the only case directly holding that the
grant of an option need not be supported by consideration:

[1]t is elementary law that an option is not always a contract but an

offer to enter into a contract coupled with a promise to hold the offer open
for a given period of time, which promise is or is not binding on the
offeror depending on whether or not it is supported by consideration ....

The only effect on an option of lack of consideration is to make the
27
promise to keep the offer open unenforceable against the optionor.

Where the optionee has given no consideration for the grant of the
option and is not bound by an employment contract but stays on in
the corporation's employ in reliance on the grant the corporation
28
should be barred by promisory estoppel from revoking the option.
This should raise no problem since the corporation in that case will in
fact have received the benefit it bargained for, i.e., retention of key
employees. A minority shareholder does not have grounds for complaint if the directors have inaugurated a program which they in
their business judgment reasonably believe will benefit the corporation. If the stock option plan is so unwise or improvident as to constitute waste or a gift of the corporate assets then the individual
directors should be held liable for their negligence or fraud. Such was
not the case here.

DOMESTIC RELATIONS-SEPARATION AGREEMENTSUNENFORCEABILITY OF PROVISION IN SEPARATION
AGREEMENT AS TO RELIGIOUS TRAINING
OF MINOR CHILD
Plaintiff a protestant, was granted a divorce from her husband, a
Roman Catholic, and was awarded custody of their only child.1 In the
24. Some courts have held that no gauge can be found to measure executive compensation, e.g., Heller v. Boylan, 29 N.Y.S.2d 653, 680 (Sup. Ct.),
aFd mem., 263 App. Div. 815, 32 N.Y.S.2d 131 (Sup. Ct., App. T. 1941). See gen-

erally, Baker, A Just Gauge for Executive Compensation, 22 HARV. Bus. REV.

75 (1943) (advocating the use of statistical data).
25. See note 22 supra.
26. 257 F.2d 388 (1st Cir. 1958). See note 5 supra.
27. 257 F.2d at 393.
28. See RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS § 90 (1932).

1. The child Was seven years old at the time the motion was filed, 146 N.E.2d
at 477.
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decree, the court adopted a separation agreement between the parties2
which provided that the minor would be reared and educated exclusively in the Roman Catholic faith.3 Plaintiff violated the agreement
by entering the child in a public school, whereupon the defendant
moved for an order under the original divorce decree that the plaintiff be held in contempt of court. The motion was denied.4 On appeal,
held, affirmed. A provision in a separation agreement which has been
incorporated into a divorce decree, directing that the party who has
been awarded the custody of a minor child rear that child in a particular religious faith and to send such child to a school affiliated with
that faith is judicially unenforceable. Hackett v. Hackett, 150 N.E.2d
431 (Ohio App. 1958).
The present state of the law regarding the enforceability of antenuptial and separation agreements5 providing that children be reared
and educated within a particular religious faith is uncertain. 6 The
weight of authority, however, favors the position that these provisions
are not judicially enforceable. 7 The reasons generally given in support
2. The provisions of the separation agreement were incorporated by reference into the divorce decree.
3. The separation agreement provided in substance that the daughter of
the parties shall be reared in the Roman Catholic faith exclusively, that she
make her first communion and be confirmed therein, attend all services as
prescribed by the church, and observe all abstinence and Lent regulations. It
was provided that the daughter attend a private school operated by the
Roman Catholics or a Roman Catholic Order.
4. 146 N.E.2d at 477.
5. Although only a separation agreement is at issue in the instant case,
because of its similarity with some antenuptial agreements required by a
few religious faiths, both agreements are discussed, though most frequently
referred to merely as separation agreements.
Divorce courts are generally bound by valid separation agreements, North
v. North, 339 Mo. 1226, 100 S.W.2d 582 (1936), but if they are not so bound
and yet desire to give effect to the agreement, the court has the power to
incorporate it into its divorce decree even though they would not have the
power to make the decree resulting therefrom in the absence of the agreement.
Dickey v. Dickey, 154 Md. 675, 141 Atl. 387 (1928). But this does not apply
to agreements which are unenforceable and invalid at the time of making.
150 N.E.2d at 434.
6. A historical survey of this question is set forth in 29 HAXv. L. REV. 485
(1916). It was noted there that, for reasons discussed, it was generally
thought that the courts neither would nor could enforce these agreements.
But at that time this country was relatively free from litigation on the subject.
For a present view of the controversy, see 6 WILLaSTON, CONTRACTS § 1744A
n.3 (rev. ed. 1938), where it was said, "Agreements between parents relating to
the religious training of their children are generally upheld." See also Weinberger v. Van Hessen, 260 N.Y. 294, 183 N.E. 429, 431 (1932), where the court
said, "Agreements between parents for a particular sort of religious upbringing have in general been held valid in this country."
For the opinion to the contrary, that these agreements are without legal
effect, and a criticism of the quotations from Williston and the Weinberger
case, see Pfeffer, Religion in the Upbringing of Children, 35 B.U.L. REV. 333,
360 (1955).
7. Stanton v. Stanton, 213 Ga. 545, 100 S.E.2d 289 (1957); Lynch v. Uhlenhopp, 248 Iowa 68, 78 N.W.2d 491 (1956); Denton v. James, 107 Kan. 729, 193
Pac. 307 (1920); Dumais v. Dumais, 152 Me. 24, 122 A.2d 322 (1956); Brewer
v. Cary, 148 Mo. App. 193, 127 S.W. 685 (1910); Boerger v. Boerger, 26 N.J.
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of this view are as follows: that, as a judical policy, the courts will
not interfere with the internal affairs of the family except where the
temporal welfare of the children is threatened and where the courts
could justify their interference without regard to any religious controversy; 8 that the courts are constitutionally disabled from entering
religious controversies; 9 that in all cases the primary consideration is
the best interests of the children' and that these interests would not
be served by requiring the children to be reared in a different religious
faith than that of their parent or guardian;" that courts of equity
generally limit the remedy of specific performance to controversies
involving property; 12 and that damages are unprovable. 13 On the other
hand, several courts have adopted the view that these agreements
are enforceable, some of the reasons being that the consideration given
for the agreement is of the highest moral caliber; 14 that the best interests of the children are in fact served by enforcement if the parent
or guardian has shown utter disregard for moral and religious duties
Super. 90, 97 A.2d 419, (Ch. 1953). See also ZOLLMAx, AMERICAN CHURCH
LAW § 39 (1933); Friedman, The Parental Right to Control the Religious
Education of a Child, 29 HARy. L. REv. 485 (1916); Pfeffer, Religion in the Upbringing of Children, 35 B.U.L. REV. 333 (1955); Note, Enforceability of Antenuptial Contracts in Mixed Marriages,50 YALE L.J. 1286 (1941).
8. Donahue v. Donahue, 142 N.J.Eq. 701, 61 A.2d 243 (Ct. Err. & App. 1948).
In Sisson v. Sisson, 271 N.Y. 285, 2 N.E.2d 660 (1936) the court said it was
without jurisdiction in a proceeding for custody of a child arising out of a
disagreement over the child's education where neither the child's health nor
welfare was threatened. It was said in Purinton v. Jamrock, 195 Mass. 187,
199-200, 80 N.E. 802, 805 (1907), '"The court will not itself prefer one church
to another, but will act without bias for the welfare of the child under the
circumstances of each case. This is a fair consensus of judicial opinion ... "
See also 2 NELSON, DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT § 15.13 (2d ed. 1945).
9. Denton v. James, 107 Kan. 729, 193 Pac. 307, 310 (1920); Brewer v. Cary,
148 Mo. App. 193, 127 S.W. 685, 691-2 (1910). See Pfeffer, Religion in the
Upbringing of Children, 35 B.U.L. REV. 333, 363-4 (1955). See also Note,
Enforceability of Antenuptial Contracts in Mixed Marriages,50 YALE L.J. 1286,
1293 (1941).
10. Pugh v. Pugh, 133 W. Va. 501, 56 S.E.2d 901 (1949). See also Annot., 15
A.L.R.2d 432, 435 (1951).
11. Boeger v. Boeger, 26 N.J. Super 90, 97 A.2d 419 (1953); Ex parte Flynn,
87 N.J. Eq. 413, 100 Atl 861 (ch. 1917); In re Nevin, (1891) 2 ch. 299. See also
Pfeffer, note 9 supra.
12. Brewer v. Cary, 148 Mo. App. 193, 127 S.W. 685 (1910); ZOLLMAN, AMERICAN CHURCH LAW § 39 (1933). This general maxim, however, has frequently
been relaxed, especially in domestic relations cases. See Note, Does Equity
Protect Property Rights in the Domestic Relations, 19 Ky. L.J. 57 (1930). See
also Note, 37 IowA L. REV. 268 (1951).
13. ZoLL AN, AMERICAN CHURCH LAW § 39 (1933); Pfeffer, Religion in the
Upbringing of Children, 35 B.U.L. REV. 333, 363 (1955).
14. In Ramon v. Ramon, 34 N.Y.S.2d 100 (N.Y.C. Dom. Rel. Ct. 1942), it
was said, in regard to antenuptial agreements made prior to mixed marriages
in the Roman Catholic church and which contain provisions similar to the
instant separation agreement, that these are the most important contracts
ever made by a Roman Catholic participant in a mixed marriage. The implication is that the agreement transcends the parties and includes both the
Church and God. For this reason the Roman Catholic participant depends
upon the compliance of the contract for his continued spiritual existance.
See Comment, 6 CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 169 (1956).

RECENT CASES
voluntarily assumed; 15 and that no constitutional disabilities are in16
volved.
The court in the instant case first rejected the movant's contention
that a separation agreement, although originally unenforceable, may
acquire legal effect by its incorporation into a court decree 17 and that
a party to such an agreement is thereafter estopped from asserting its
unenforceability. 18 The court then adopted the majority view that
agreements of this nature between parents concerning the religious
education of their children are unenforceable. Although there were
no new reasons given by the court in support of this position the existing reasons, views and commentaries of other courts and legal
writers were integrated for the first time into one persuasive decision.
The result is the strongest authoritative stand to date against the enforceability of antenuptial or separation agreements that contain provisions requiring that the children of the parties to the agreement be
reared exclusively in one religious faith and be educated in the schools
affiliated with that faith.
As was p6inted out by the court, the issue in this case involves a
basic tenet of our political and religious heritage, that neither Church
nor State should intermeddle in the affairs of the other. This is perhaps more than a legal doctrine-it is felt in some quarters to rest at
the very foundation of religious freedoms. 19 The decision represents
what now may be deemed the general rule rather than the mere
weight of authority. The theories most often used in support of this
position will probably include the aforementioned considerations of
judicial policy, constitutional rights and limitations, and the best
interests of the children.

LABOR LAW-LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACTAVAILABILITY OF STATE COMMON LAW REMEDIES
THOUGH RELIEF OBTAINABLE UNDER LMRA
A machinist expelled from his union in California and a nonunion Alabama electrician kept from his job by a strike obtained
state court damage judgments for the injurious consequences of the
union activity against the unions concerned. Both judgments were
15. Shearer v. Shearer, 73 N.Y.S.2d 337 (Sup. Ct. 1947); Comment, 6
CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 169 (1956).

16. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952). See also Lynch v. Uhlenhopp,

248 Iowa 68, 78 N.W.2d 491, 500 (1956) (dissent).

17. 150 N.E. 2d at 433-434.
18. Id. N.E.2d at 434-435.
19. For a short discussion of this matter, see Pfeffer, Religion in the Upbringing of Children, 35 B.U.L. REv. 333, 358 (1955).
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upheld by the state appellate courts. The unions protested that state
jurisdiction was pre-empted by the Labor Management Relations Act
(hereinafter Taft-Hartley or LMRA). On certiorari to the Supreme
Court of the United States, held, affirmed. The Taft-Hartley Act does
not preclude state court damage judgments for breach of contract or
tortious conduct by labor unions where relief through the National
Labor Relations Board, though available, would be inadequate. International Ass'n of Machinistsv. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958); International Union, UAW-CIO v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958).
In the field of labor relations no area has caused more litigation and
comment' than what Mr. Justice Frankfurter has called "the rather
subtle line of demarcation between exclusive federal and allowable
state jurisdiction over labor problems."'2 The decisions do not yield
themselves to any very satisfactory system of classification, but generally it can be said that the Taft-Hartley Act has reserved to the
NLRB jurisdiction over conduct proscribed 3 by the act, as well as
activities protected by it. 4 Taft-Hartley, however, represents Congressional regulation only in the field of labor relations. Hence, state
jurisdiction has been consistently upheld where the state controls are
directed at confirming union activity within the standards required
of all citizens, rather than at outlawing the objectives of such activity.
Within this area, state court injunctions may be issued to protect the
person and property rights of citizens from unlawful conduct, or to
restrain other conduct neither prohibited nor protected by the act.5
1. See generally on federal-state jurisdiction, Cox and Seidman, Federalism
and Labor Relations, 64 HARv. L. REv. 211 (1950); Cox, Federalism in the
Law of Labor Relations, 67 HARV. L. REv. 1297 (1954); Gerash, Recent Action
in the No-Man's Land of Labor Law, 33 DICTA 199 (1956); Glushien, Federal
Preemptionin Labor Relations, 15 FED. B. J. 4 (1955); Isaacson, Federal Versus

State Jurisdiction in Labor Relations, 42 A.B.A.J. 415 (1956); James, State
Against FederalJurisdictionin Labor Relations, 31 CoNN. B.J. 5 (1957); Petro,
Labor Relations Law, 32 N.Y.U.L. REv. 267 (1957); Rose, The Labor Management Relations Act and the State's Power to Grant Relief, 39 VA. L. REV.
765 (1953); Turnbull, Federal-State Jurisdictional Problems, 7 LAB. L.J. 5
(1956; Van de Water and Petrowitz, Federal-State Jurisdiction and the

Constitutional Framework in Industrial Relations, 31 So. CAL. L. REv. 111
(1958); Comment, 35 TEXAs L. REV. 555 (1957); Comment, 20 U. CH.
REV. 109 (1952).

L.

2. Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros. Co., 348 U.S. 511, 519

(1955).
3. Capital Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 501 (1954); Garner v. Teamsters
Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953); Plankinton Packing Co. v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Bd., 338 U.S. 953 (1950).
4. International Union UAW, CIO v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454 (1950); Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd.,
340 U.S. 383 (1951). Cf. Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468 (1955), 8
VA~N. L. REV. 916 (1955). See Isaacson, supra note 1, at 415-16.
5. E.g., Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957); UAW v. Wisconsin

Employment Relations Bd., 351 U.S. 266 (1956); International Union UAW,
AFL v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245 (1949). Prior

to Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953), state courts felt free to

enjoin concerted activities neither protected nor prohibited by Taft-Hartley.
E.g., Goodwins, Inc. v. Hagedorn, 303 N.Y. 300, 101 N.E.2d 697 (1951).

RECENT CASES
The instant cases raise anew the problem whether state courts may
entertain common law suits for damages, where the actionable conduct
is prohibited by Taft-Hartley but relief through the NLRB is unavailable6 or inadequate. In United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr.
Corp.7 the Supreme Court approved such state jurisdiction, as to tort,
but there the plaintiff was an employer and there was no compensatory relief available under the LMRA. Alternately praised and denounced, 8 Laburnum has been the subject of speculation as to whether
it would be extended beyond its own facts. 9 As to the jurisdiction of
state courts to award damages in cases of unjust expulsion of a union
member, the lower courts have been divided. 10
Garner v. Teamsters Unionl struck down a state court attempt to
enjoin picketing which was illegal both under the LMRA and the
Pennsylvania statute. This was done because the state court injunction
duplicated available NLRB relief in the form of a cease and desist order. 12 But in Laburnum and the instant cases state court judgments
in tort and contract, including punitive damages 3 and compensation
for mental suffering, were sustained, despite the fact that the union
conduct involved was an unfair labor practice. 14 In both Gonzales and
Later decisions have been undecided as to whether Garner should be confined to its exact facts. E.g., Milwaukee Boston Store Co. v. American Fed'n
of Hosiery Workers, 269 Wis. 338, 69 N.W.2d 762 (1955).
6. Cf. Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957), in which a
"no-man's land" is created where the NLRB declines jurisdiction because the
amount of interstate commerce involved does not meet its jurisdictional
standards. This "tidelands" area will be much constricted by the new NLRB
standards, recently announced. See N.L.R.B. Announces Changes in Exercise
of Jurisdiction, NLRB Press Release, No. R-576, Oct. 2, 1958.
7. 347 U.S. 656 (1954). This was an action brought by an employer to
recover damages from a union which had engaged in violent and destructive
conduct in violation of both state law and presumably the LMRA. The
Supreme Court held that state jurisdiction was permissible since it neither
duplicated nor conflicted with remedies available under the LMRA.
8. Compare Cox, Federalism in the Law of Labor Relations, 67 HARV. L.
REV. 1297, 1323 (1954) with Petro, Labor Relations Law, 32 N.Y.U.L. REv.
267, 272-273 (1957).
9. See, e.g., Isaacson, Federal Versus State Jurisdiction in Labor Relations
42 A.B.A.J. 415, 419 (1956); Van de Water and Petrowitz, Federal-State

JurisdictionalProblems and the ConstitutionalFramework in IndustrialRelations, 31 So. CAL. L. REv. 111, 129 (1958).

10. State court has jurisdiction, International Union UAW, CIO v. Hinz,
218 F.2d 664 (6th Cir. 1955). Contra, Born v. Laube, 213 F.2d 407 (9th Cir.
1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 855 (1954).
11. 346 U.S. 485 (1953); see 7 VAND. L. REV. 422 (1954).
12. "But it is clear that the Board was vested with power to entertain
petitioners' grievance, to issue its own complaint . . . and . . . prevent irreparable injury to petitioners while their case was being considered." 346
U.S. at 489.
13. In the Russell case suits totaling $1,500,000, arising out of the same
strike, were pending against the union, the majority of the amount being for
punitive damages. 356 U.S. at 658.
14. In Gonzales the conduct could be classified under § 8 (b) (2), because the
expulsion might constitute an attempt to cause an employer to "discriminate
against an employee with respect to whom membership in such organization
has been denied or terminated on some ground other than his failure to tender
the periodic dues and the initiation fees . . . ." 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
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Russell a cease and desist order could have been issued, back wages
restored, and, in the former, reinstatement ordered. 15 The emphasis in
Laburnum and the instant cases is placed on the fact that, although
there may be some potential conflict between state and federal remedies, the proposed state damage judgments do not duplicate federal
remedy under Taft-Hartley. 16 The instant cases, when read with
Laburnum, indicate clearly the approval of state court damage judgments in lieu of or as a complement to traditional remedies by state
equity courts where state jurisdiction is founded on prevention of violence or any other conduct neither protected nor prohibited by the
LMRA.17 The federal act has not precluded state action to enjoin
violence, such as was present in Russell, nor has it pre-empted state
jurisdiction to determine and enforce the rights of union membership,
which was the issue in Gonzales. In such cases the fact that there is
incidentally a labor dispute does not pre-empt state jurisdiction, if the
remedy of damages does not duplicate available relief under TaftHartley, but rather presents only a potential conflict. Such conflict with
federal policy in the case of damages is actually less serious than it is
in the case of injunctions or other equitable relief, because an improperly granted injunction, even though reversed on appeal, will destroy
the collective action at the critical moment, whereas a damage judgment can be reversed with little or no effect on collective action. The
§ 158(b) (2) (1952). In Russell the Court assumed that the union's conduct

violated § 8(b) (1) (A), which provides that it is an unfair labor practice
"(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in Section 7 . . . ." i.e., the right not to participate in collective
activity. 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1)(A) (1952).
15. "[T]he Board . . .shall issue . . . an order requiring such person to
cease and desist from such unfair labor practice, and . . .take such affirmative
action including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will
effectuate the policies of this Act . . . .", 61 Stat 147 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(c) (1952). See Petro, supra, note 1, for a suggestion that the statute
should be construed as to include ordering the union to pay for any damage
it does, over and above reimbursement for back pay.

16. But cf. Mr. Chief Justice Warren, dissenting in Gonzales, "[Tlhe
necessity for uniformity in the regulation of labor relations subject to the
Federal Act forbade recourse to potentially conflicting state remedies." 356

U.S. at 623.
17. But cf. Garmon v. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, 49 Cal. 2d 595, 320
P.2d 473 (1958), cert. granted, 357 U.S. 925 (1958), in which damages were
given for peaceful picketing. The employer had earlier been given an injunction and damages in the state court on the theory that, since he did
not meet the NLRB jurisdictional standards, he would be remediless otherwise. 45 Cal. 2d 657, 291 P.2d 1 (1955). Since the state court felt it was filling
a vacuum in federal law, it attempted to apply federal law. The Supreme
Court of the United States vacated the injunction and remanded the case
on the issue of damages, remarking that it was not clear whether the state
court would have given damages had it applied state law. 353 U.S. 26
(1957). The state court interpreted this as sanctioning state court damages
in the absence of available state equity relief. This seems to be a misinterpretation of the remand instructions, and the granting of certiorari apparently
strengthens this assumption, but the forthcoming decision should settle the
question whether state court damages may be given even though no state
court injunction can be had.
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difficulty, however, of ascertaining the boundaries of the "neither
prohibited nor protected" area is still with us.
The mere fact that Taft-Hartley condemns and provides some relief
for such union misconduct as was present in the instant cases would
not justify a holding that state jurisdiction is pre-empted. Upon such
facts the law of torts and contracts should lay hold of the union conduct without regard to its purpose or context, making the existence
of a labor dispute irrelevant. 18 There is nothing in Garner which precludes the holding in the instant cases, since it was duplication and
actual conflict which were forbidden there. These cases dispel some
of the confusion which surrounded Laburnum and they add no new
problems 19 which are not always present in any area where federal
and state authority are intertwined.

LABOR LAW-LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACTHOT CARGO CLAUSE INSUFFICIENT AS A DEFENSE

TO VIOLATION OF SECTION 8(b)(4)(A)
A collective bargaining agreement between general contractors
and defendant Carpenters Union contained a so-called "hot cargo"
clause providing that employees should not be required to handle
non-union materials. The union told its members not to install certain
non-union doors, and a complaint was filed with the National Labor
Relations Board charging the union with a violation of section 8 (b)
(4) (A) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 which makes
it an unfair labor practice for a union to induce employees to engage
in a secondary boycott.' The union asserted the hot cargo clause as a
18. The same kind of conduct interfering with any advantageous relationship would give rise to the same liability under other circumstances. See
PROSSER, TORTS § 107 (2d ed. 1955).
19. E.g., It can be argued that the instant cases will tend to cause aggrieved
employees and employers to seek relief in the form of damage suits in favorable state forums in preference to the somewhat less benevolent administrative procedures of Taft-Hartley. But see Amalgamated Clothing Workers
v. Richman Bros. Co., 348 U.S. 511, 520 (1955), in which it is suggested that
a union might be able to force a National Labor Relations Board determination of the impropriety of the employer's resort to state courts by charging
the employer with an unfairlabor practice in seeking state court remedy.
1. The statute declares that it shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor
organization or its agent:
"(4) to engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees of any
employer to engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of
their employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise
handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to
perform any services where an object thereof is: (A) forcing or requiring any employer . . . to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or

otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or
manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person ......
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defense. The Board rejected this defense, 2 and the court of appeals for
the ninth circuit affirmed. 3 On certiorari to the Supreme Court of the
United States, held, affirmed. A collective bargaining agreement providing that employees shall not be required to handle non-union goods,
even if legal, does not excuse union inducement of a secondary boycott in violation of section 8 (b) (4) (A). Local 1976, United Bhd. of
Carpentersv. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93 (1958).4
The hot cargo-secondary boycott problem springs from the conflict
between the supposed intent of Congress that section 8 (b) (4) (A)
should prohibit all secondary boycotts5 and the narrow language of the

act which forbids only one means of effecting such a boycott. Whatever Congress may have intended, the language of the statute only
prohibits a union from attempting to persuade employees to engage
in a secondary boycott, and courts have consistently said that a union
does not violate the act when it appeals directly to the employer6 or
when its members act on their own initiative to boycott the goods of
another.? However, since the Board first ruled on the hot cargo
question in 1949,8 it has vacillated among four different positions:
namely, (1) since section 8 (b) (4) (A) was designed to protect only
the neutral or secondary employer who is unwilling to boycott the
goods of another and was not designed to protect the public or the
primary employer, a hot cargo clause is a valid defense because the
secondary employer has removed himself from the protected group
Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 8(b) (4) (A),
61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (A) (1952).
2. Sand Door &Plywood Co., 113 N.L.R.B. 1210 (1955).
3. NLRB v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 241 F.2d 147 (9th Cir. 1957).
4. The Supreme Court combined for decision this case with two other hot
cargo cases which were themselves combined for decision by the NLRB
under the style of American Iron & Machine Works Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 800
(1956), and by the court of appeals sub nom., General Drivers Union v.
NLRB, 247 F.2d 71 (D.C. Cir. 1957). The Supreme Court's holding and reasoning in the instant case also applies to these two cases.
5. Senator Taft said:
"The Senator will find a great many decisions .

.

. which hold that under

the common law a secondary boycott is unlawful. [E.g., Burham v. Doud, 217
Mass. 351, 104 N.E. 841 (1914); see Annot., 52 A.L.R. 1144.] Subsequently,
under the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, it became impossible to stop
a secondary boycott [see e.g., United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219
(1941) ] or any other kind of a strike no matter how unlawful it may have
been at common law. All this provision [§ 8(b) (4) (A)] of the bill does is to
reverse the effect of the law as to secondary boycotts. It has been set forth
that there are good secondary boycotts and bad secondary boycotts. Our committee heard evidence for weeks and never succeeded in having anyone tell
us any difference between different kinds of secondary boycotts. So we have
so broadened the provisions dealing with secondary boycotts as to make them
an unfair labor practice." 93 CONG. REc. 4198 (1947).

6. E.g., Schatte v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees,
182 F.2d 158, 165 (9th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 827 (1950).
7. E.g., Douds v. Milk Drivers Union, 133 F. Supp. 336, 341 (D.N.J. 1955)
(dictum).
8. Conway's Express, 87 N.L.R.B. 972 (1949), aff'd sub nom. Rabouin v.
NLRB, 195 F.2d 906 (2d Cir. 1952); Note, 54 MxcH. L. REv. 253 (1955).
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by signing such a contract; 9 (2) the clause is illegal and void because
it is directly opposed to the policy of the statute which is to protect the
public and the primary employer as well as the secondary employer
from the disruptive effect of secondary boycott; 0 (3) a hot cargo
clause is not a valid defense because the statute, literally interpreted,
prohibits certain kinds of union conduct whether permitted by contract
or not, but neither is the clause an illegal contract since there may
be alternative ways of performing it which are not barred by the
statute;" (4) a hot cargo clause is not a good defense in any case in
which section 8 (b) (4) (A) has been violated, and, moreover, is illegal
in common carrier contracts for the reason that such a clause violates
13
12
the antidiscrimination provision of the Interstate Commerce Act.
Prior to its decision in the instant case, the Supreme Court had never
passed on the hot cargo question, 14 but each one of the first three
positions outlined above had been adopted by at least one of the
several courts of appeal and federal district courts that had decided
5
cases on the point.'
Strictly speaking, the Supreme Court did not adopt one of these
four positions in the principal case. The case stands for the narrow
proposition that an appeal by a union to employees that is prohibited
under section 8 (b) (4) (A) in the absence of a hot cargo clause is
likewise prohibited when there is such a clause.' 6 The Court's position
9. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 105 N.L.R.B. 740 (1953); Conway's Express,

87 N.L.R.B. 972 (1949).
10. McAllister Transfer Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 1769 (1954); Note, 64 YAIE L. J.

1201 (1955).

11. Crowley's Milk Co., 116 N.L.R.B. 1408 (1956); American Iron & Machine

Works Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 800 (1956); Sand Door & Plywood Co., 113 N.L.R.B.
1210 (1955).
12. "It shall be unlawful for any common carrier by motor vehicle engaged
In interstate or foreign commerce . . . to subject any particular person ...
to any unjust discrimination or any undue or unreasonable prejudice or dis" 54 Stat. 924 (1940), 49 U.S.C. §
advantage in any respect whatsoever ....
316(d) (1952).

13. Genuine Parts Co., 41 L.R.R.M. 1087, 119 N.L.R.B. No. 53 (Nov. 8,
1957), 7 BUFFALO L. REV. 322 (1958).
14. Subsequent to its decision in the instant case, the Supreme Court
decided another hot cargo case: NLRB v. Milk Drivers Union, 357 U.S. 345
(1958), reversing 245 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1957), see note 15 infra. In a memorandum opinion, the Court decided the case on the authority of the instant case.
15. Following the order given in the text, federal court authorities for
the different positions are: (1) General Drivers Union v. NLRB, 247 F.2d
71 (D.C. Cir. 1957), 11 VAwD. L. REV. 632 (1958); Milk Drivers Union v. NLRB,
245 F.2d. 817 (2d Cir. 1957), 42 MINn. L. REV. 502 (1958); Rabouin v. NLRB.,
195 F.2d 906 (2d Cir. 1952); Madden v. Local 442, Teamsters Union, 114
F. Supp. 932 (W.D. Wis. 1953); (2) see Humphey v. Local 294, International
Bhd. of Teamsters, 25 L.R.R.M. 2318 (N.D.N.Y. 1950) (dictum); (3) NLRB v.
United Bhd. of Carpenters, 241 F.2d 147 (9th Cir. 1957); Alpert v. United Bhd.
of Carpenters, 143 F. Supp. 371 (D. Mass 1956), 70 HARV. L. REV. 735 1957).
16. 357 U.S. at 108-09. If a hot cargo clause is not a good defense to a § 8(b)
(4) violation, it follows that it is not a good defense to a violation of § 303

of the act which provides that an employer may sue a union for damages for
the same offenses that are made unfair labor practices under § 8(b) (4). See
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coincides with position one above to the extent that both assume that
the statute was designed to protect only the secondary employer, 7
but an opposite result is reached in this decision by holding that the
employer cannot contract away his protection under the statute by
signing a hot cargo provision. 18 The Court expressly reserved judgment on the legality of the clause, finding that its ruling did not require a determination of this question. 9 However, the opinion contains dictum that the clause may still govern some of the relations
between the parties2 which seems to endorse the third position above.
The Court further indicates its attitude on the question by disagreeing
with the supposition that it was the intention of Congress to protect
the public and all employers alike,21 an assumption that most decisions
have relied on in holding hot cargo clauses to be illegal. 22 It dismissed
the argument that the clause is illegal under the Interstate Commerce Act by saying that it is the function of the Interstate Commerce Commission, not the NLRB, to decide the effect of a hot cargo
clause on the obligations of a carrier to a shipper.2 It seems from this
reasoning that the Supreme Court, if called upon to decide the question directly, will hold that a hot cargo clause, though not a valid
defense to a violation of section 8 (b) (4) (A), is nevertheless a legal
contract.
Should the courts in subsequent decisions construe narrowly the
interpretation which this case gives to the language of the statute,
an unusual situation could result. If a hot cargo clause is a valid contract, a union could enforce its provisions against the employer by a
suit for specific performance or damages 24 even though the statute prohibits the union from enforcing it by self-help. 25 The Supreme Court's
decision, if so interpreted, would perhaps delay some secondary boyKon-Tempo Furniture, Inc. v. Kessler, 145 F. Supp. 341, 345 (E.D.N.Y. 1956)
(by implication).
17. 357 U.S. at 99.

18. Id. at 105-06.

19. Id. at 108.
20. Ibid.
21. Id. at 99.
22. See note 10 supra.
23. 357 U.S. at 110. Subsequent to the Board's decision in the Genuine Parts
case, note 13 supra,the Interstate Commerce Commission decided that a carrier
cannot refuse to handle goods declared "unfair" by a union merely because
he is a party to a hot cargo agreement. Galveston Truck Line v. Ada Motor
Line, 73 M.C.C. 617 (1957). The effect of that decision together with the
decision in the instant case is to make a hot cargo agreement between a
carrier and a union meaningless. Neither party can enforce its provisions
without violating a statute.
24. Section 301 of the act provides that either party to a collective-bargaining agreement may bring suit in the federal courts for damages for its
breach. The Supreme Court has allowed specific performance of an arbitration clause in a union contract, Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S.
448 (1957); but the question of whether § 303 permits specific performance
of other types of union contracts has not been finally decided.
25. Cf. 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1779 (1938). But cf. id. §§ 1752-53.
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cotts, but it would have little effect in reducing their number. However, in view of the fact that a union can coerce an employer to sign
a hot cargo agreement almost as easily as it can force him to engage
in a boycott, it is unlikely that the courts will take such a narrow position since it would permit a union to do indirectly what the statute
prohibits it from doing directly. 26

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-ABSENCE FROM STATE AS A
BASIS OF TOLLING STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DESPITE
AVAILABILITY OF SERVICE UNDER NONRESIDENT
MOTORIST STATUTE
Plaintiff, a resident of Ohio, brought suit in the federal district court1
of that state against a nonresident motorist on a personal injury claim
arising out of an automobile collision on Ohio highways. The defendant
had at all times subsequent to the accident continued to maintain a
Michigan residence and had not returned to Ohio prior to commencement of this action. Service of process was had upon the Ohio Secretary
of State in accordance with the nonresident motorist statute2 almost
four years after the collision. Also in effect at this time was a saving
clause 3 to the Ohio, two year statute of limitations which provided for
the tolling of the statute during periods of defendant's absence from
the state. Upon appeal from an order dismissing the complaint, held,
dismissal set aside and case remanded. A statute of limitations may be
tolled by a defendant's nonresidence despite the fact that service of
process can be obtained during this time under a nonresident motorist
statute. Chamberlainv. Lowe, 252 F.2d 563 (6th Cir. 1958).
26. Cf. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 254 (1953); 6 CoRBiN, CONTRACTS
§§ 1376-77 (1954).
1. Jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (a)
(1952).
2. OHIo REv. CODE Az w. § 2703.20 (Baldwin 1958). Service of process upon
nonresident owners or operators of motor vehicles: "Any nonresident of
this state, being the operator or owner of any motor vehicle, who accepts
the privilege extended by the laws of this state to nonresident operators and
owners, of operating a motor vehicle or of having the same operated, within
the state, or any resident of this state, being the licensed operator or owner
of any motor vehicle under the laws of this state, who subsequently becomes
a nonresident or conceals his whereabouts, by such acceptance or licensure
and by the operation of such vehicle within this state makes the secretary of
the state of Ohio his agent for the service of process in any civil suit or proceeding instituted in the courts of this state against such operator or owner of
such motor vehicle, arising out of, or by reason of, any accident or collision
occurring within this state in which such motor vehicle is involved."
3. O1ro REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.15 (Baldwin 1958). The saving clause reads
in part: "After the cause of action accrues if he departs from the state, or
absconds or conceals himself, the time of his absence or concealment shall not
be computed as any part of a period within which the action must be
brought."
(1)
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Saving clauses, which provide for the tolling of statutes of limitation
during periods of a defendant's absence from the state, originated in
England 4 and were adopted in this country long before the advent of
concentrated interstate traffic. 5 In 1916 the Supreme Court of the
United States held constitutional the first nonresident motorist statute6
by which personal service of process could be had upon a nonresident
motorist through the means of a statutorily designated officer of the
state. Similar statutes have now been enacted throughout the country
with little or no consideration being given to their proper relation
with saving clauses.7 These statutes generally do not specify whether
substituted service of process upon the secretary of state is sufficient to
prevent the tolling of a limitation period under the provisions of a saving clause. Lacking legislative guidance, it was perhaps inevitable that
a split of authority would develop on this problem. The majority view
looks to the basic concept of the saving clause in holding that the
statute of limitations is not tolled where personal service of process
can be had upon a statutorily appointed agent of the defendant. 8 On
the other hand, the minority view holds that the limitation period
is tolled despite the ability to obtain substituted service and that the
letter of the law must be followed where at all possible, any other
interpretation being open to criticism as judicial legislation. 9 Several
4. BUSWELL, THE STATUTE OF LIImTATIONS AND ADVERSE POSSESSION § 116
(1889). Statute 4 Anne, c. 16, § 19 first provided for the tolling of the statute
of limitations while defendant was beyond the seas.
5. Note, 33 ILL. L. REV. 351, 352 (1938), indicates some eastern states enacted
the saving clause in its original English form.
6. Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160 (1916). See also Hess v. Pawloski, 274
U.S. 352 (1927).
7. Almost uniformly the courts have considered the argument that had the
legislature intended an exception to the saving clause it would have done so
by appropriate language. Macri v. Flaherty, 115 F. Supp. 739, 744 (E.D.S.C.
1953); Staten v. Weiss, 78 Idaho 616, 308 P.2d 1021, 1023 (1957); Haver v. Bassett, 287 S.W.2d 342, 346 (Mo. 1956); Gotheiner v. Lenihan, 20 N.J. Misc. 119,
25 A.2d 430, 432 (Sup. Ct. 1942); Couts v. Rose, 152 Ohio St. 458, 90 N.E.2d 139,
141 (1950); Canaday v. Hayden, 80 Ohio App. 1, 74 N.E.2d 635, 636 (1947);
Bode v. Flynn, 213 Wis. 509, 252 N.W. 284, 286 (1934).
8. An expression of the majority view will be found in the following cases:
Moore v. Dunham, 240 F.2d 198 (10th Cir. 1956) (applying Oklahoma law);
Smith v. Pasqualetto, 146 F. Supp. 680 (D. Mass. 1956) (applying Massachusetts
law); Peters v. Tuell Dairy Co., 250 Ala. 600, 35 So. 2d 344 (1948); Coombs
v. Darling, 116 Conn. 643, 166 Atl. 70 (1933); Nelson v. Richardson, 295 Ill.
App. 504, 15 N.E.2d 17 (1938); Kokenge v. Holthaus, 243 Iowa 571, 52 N.W.2d
711 (1952); Haver v. Bassett, 287 S.W.2d 342 (Mo. 1956); Fuller v. Stuart,
3 Misc. 2d 456, 153 N.Y.S.2d 188 (Sup. Ct. 1956); Canaday v. Hayden, 80 Ohio
App. 1, 74 N.E.2d 635 (1947); Busby v. Shafer, 75 S.D. 428, 66 N.W.2d 910
(1954); Arrowood v. McMinn County, 173 Tenn. 562, 121 S.W.2d 566 (1938);
Reed v. Rosenfield, 115 Vt. 76, 51 A.2d 189 (1947).
9. An expression of the minority view will be found in the following cases:
Macri v. Flaherty, 115 F. Supp. 739 (E.D.S.C. 1953) (applying South Carolina
law); Staten v. Weiss, 78 Idaho 616, 308 P.2d 1021 (1957); Gotheiner v. Leniban, 20 N.J. Misc. 119, 25 A.2d 430 (Sup. Ct. 1942); Maguire v. Yellow Taxi
Corp., 253 App. Div. 249, 1 N.Y.S.2d 749 (1st Dep't 1938); Couts v. Rose, 152
Ohio St. 458, 90 N.E.2d 139 (1950); Bode v. Flynn, 213 Wis. 509, 252 N.W. 284
(1934).

RECENT CASES
distinctions have been drawn to reconcile the divergent decisions, e.g.,
the wording to be found in the individual statutes, 10 the influence of
prior decisions within the jurisdiction with regard to promissory
notes" and corporations, 12 and the somewhat nebulous feeling that
service upon the secretary of state is not as fully satisfactory as actual
service upon the defendant. 13 Basically, however, the conflict has been
between the spirit of the law and the letter of the law.
The decision in the present case is based upon the holding of the
Ohio Supreme Court in Couts v. Rose' 4 which adopted the minority
view despite the fact that there had been two prior lower court decisions to the contrary. 5 The federal court in the instant case considered
both the Couts case and the prior view and concluded that the latter
had been distinctly overruled. Thus the minority view appears to be
the present reflection of Ohio law. This decision once again brings
into focus the inherent conflict between the saving clause of the
statutes of limitation and the nonresident motorist statutes, thus raising the problem of how the rights and liabilities of the country's many
million nonresident motorists can be effectively harmonized.
The most practical answer to this conflict would be the enactment of
10. It was said in conjunction with the wording of the South Carolina saving
clause: "[Tihis section applies not only to a resident of this State who has

gone abroad temporarily, and then returns, but it also applies to one who
has never been a resident." Macri v. Flaherty, 115 F. Supp. 739, 743 (E.D.S.C.
1953). In discussing those cases which have followed the minority view it
was said: "The difference in the language of the statutes in those states as
compared with the Ohio statute may account in part for the conclusions
reached by the courts." Canaday v. Hayden, 80 Ohio App. 1, 74 N.E.2d 635,
637 (1947).
11. The decision of prior promissory note cases has been followed in upholding the minority view. Couts v. Rose, 152 Ohio St. 458, 90 N.E.2d 139, 141
(1950); Staten v. Weiss, 78 Idaho 616, 308 P.2d 1021, 1022 (1957).
12. Kokenge v. Holthaus, 243 Iowa 571, 52 N.W.2d 711, 712 (1952) (following
prior corporation case in holding with majority); Arrowood v. McMinn
County, 173 Tenn. 562, 566, 121 S.W.2d 566, 568 (1938) (following prior railroad liability case in holding with majority); Bode v. Flynn, 213 Wis. 509, 252
N.W. 284, 285-86 (1934) (following prior insurance co. case in holding with
minority).
13. Conceding that from the viewpoint of the defendant it would be more
desirable to be served personally than by registered mail, yet it is difficult to
see how the plaintiff has in any way been prejudiced since by either method he
is able to secure an in personam judgment. This matter has been discussed in
several cases. Staten v. Weiss, 78 Idaho 616, 308 P.2d 1021, 1023 (1957); Haver
v. Bassett, 287 S.W.2d 342, 345-46 (Mo. 1956); Maguire v. Yellow Taxi Corp.,
253 App. Div. 249, 1 N.Y.S.2d 749, 752 (1st Dep't 1938).
14. 152 Ohio St. 458, 90 N.E.2d 139 (1950) 7
15. Canaday v. Hayden, 80 Ohio App. 1, 74 N.E.2d 635 (1947); Lile v.
Powers, 24 Ohio Op. 124 (C.P. 1942). In the Couts case the court did not
consider the reasoning of these two decisions and some doubt was expressed
as to whether or not a distinction was intended to be drawn on the fact situation in the Couts case. The fact that the lower court had based its decision on
the authority of the Canaday case was recognized in the statement of facts
which preceded the decision in Couts v. Rose, 152 Ohio St. 458, 90 N.E.2d 139,
140 (1950).
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clear and definitive statutes.16 Should the legislatures give this matter
full consideration it is felt that the more reasonable majority view
would be adopted, giving effect to the purpose of the statute of limitations in preventing stale claims and also relieving the nonresident
motorist of the burden of indefinite liability n The question of whether
or not the minority view is in conflict with the privileges and immunities clause 18 of the federal constitution, in denying to a nonresident
defendant the privilege of pleading the statute of limitations which is
granted to a resident defendant, was discussed in an early state supreme court decision. 19 It was there held that the ability to rely on
the statute of limitations was not one of the fundamental privileges
guaranteed by that clause. In view of the importance of this matter it
would seem that all possible constitutional grounds should be fully
explored. Both the equal protection clause20 and the due process
clause2l might be grounds on which to challenge the minority holding.
16. It would seem that one of the national automobile or safety organizations
would be interested in pressing for such uniform legislation throughout the
country. This might also be a proper subject for the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
17. At least one state has attempted to resolve the conflict through legislative
action with something more than anticipated difficulty. In 1928 the following
statute was enacted in conjunction with the saving clause: "But this section
does not apply while a designation made in pursuance of law of a resident of
the state on whom a summons may be served for another person or corporation remains in force." N.Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT § 19. However, it was held in
Maguire v. Yellow Taxi Corp., 253 App. Div. 249, 1 N.Y.S.2d 749 (1st Dep't
1938) that the above section is not satisfied by the statutory appointment of
the secretary of state since the legislature had in mind the appointment of
a revocable agent. Later this section was amended to read:
"But this section does not apply in either of the following cases:
"1. While a designation or appointment, voluntary or involuntary, made
in pursuance of law, of a resident or nonresident person, corporation, or
private or public officer on whom a summons may be served within the
state for another resident or non-resident person or corporation with the
same legal force and validity as if served personally on such person or
corporation within the state, remains in force."
The court's objection to the early statute appears now to have been adequately
met and the intent of the legislature has been upheld in two recent cases.
Maryland Cas. Co. v. Draney, 2 Misc. 2d 637, 155 N.Y.S.2d 845 (Sup. Ct. 1956);
Fuller v. Stuart, 3 Misc. 2d 456, 153 N.Y.S.2d 188 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
Tennessee, although long committed to the majority view, has enacted
legislation in this field by an addition to the nonresident motorist statute which
reads in part: "The agency of the secretary of state to accept service of process
shall continue for a period of one (1) year from the date of any accident or
injury and shall not be revoked by the death of such nonresident within such
period of one (1) year." TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-224 (1956).
18. U. S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
19. Bode v. Flynn, 213 Wis. 509, 252 N.W. 284, 286-87 (1934).
20. U. S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The test of validity of statutes under the
equal protection clause centers about the unreasonable and arbitrary classification of the group against whom such legislation is directed. Can it not be
said that the exposure to indefinite liability imposed by the minority view is
an unreasonable and arbitrary discrimination against nonresident motorist as
a group.
21. U. S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. In order to invalidate a statute under this
clause it must be shown that the statute itself is unreasonable or arbitrary.
Might it not be argued that the saving clause which once served a useful
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Should such a challenge successfully invalidate the minority view it
would be a bold step in the direction of stabilizing the rights and
liabilities of our many nonresident motorists.

NEGLIGENCE-LANDOWNERS-DUTY OF BASEBALL CLUB
TO PROTECT INVITEES FROM INJURIOUS ACTS OF
THIRD PARTIES
While attending a baseball game, plaintiff, aged sixty-nine, sustained
severe injuries by being pushed from her chair and trampled upon by
spectators scrambling for a foul ball. In an action against the baseball
club, plaintiff alleged that defendant was negligent in failing to have
an usher near her box at the time of the incident to preserve order
among the spectators and that this negligence was the proximate cause
of her injuries. Plaintiff received a judgment for $3500. On appeal, held,
affirmed. The duty of a landowner to use reasonable care to protect
invitees from dangerous acts of third persons which may reasonably
be anticipated extends to a baseball club in the protection of its spectators. Lee v. National League Baseball Club of Milwaukee, 4 Wis.
2d 168, 89 N.W.2d 811 (1958).
Although the operator of a place of amusement is not generally held
to be an insurer of his patrons' safety, he must exercise reasonable
care for their protection' and must guard against dangers of which
he knows or should reasonably anticipate.2 In particular, he has a duty
to control third persons upon his premises in order to protect his invitees from injury caused by the misconduct of such parties. 3 This has
purpose in preserving a cause of action against a nonresident defendant has
become unreasonable and arbitrary with regard to nonresident motorist who
can be made subject to personal jurisdiction of the courts through service of
process on the secretary of state.
1. Phoenix Amusement Co. v. White, 306 Ky. 361, 208 S.W.2d 64, 66 (1948);
Henry v. Segal, 174 Pa. Super. 313, 101 A.2d 149, 151 (1953); Whitfield v. Cox,
189 Va. 219, 52 S.E.2d 72, 73-74 (1949); Leek v. Tacoma Baseball Club, 38

Wash. 2d 362, 229 P.2d 329, 330 (1951).

2. Legler v. Kennington-Saenger Theatres, Inc., 172 F.2d 982 (5th Cir.
1949); Johnson v. Amphitheatre Corp., 206 Minn. 282, 288 N.W. 386 (1939);
Hughes v. St. Louis Nat'l League Baseball Club, 218 S.W.2d 632, modified, 224
S.W.2d 989 (Mo. 1949); Pfeifer v. Standard Gateway Theater, Inc., 259 Wis.
333, 48 N.W.2d 505 (1951). But see Travis v. Metropolitan Theatres Corp., 91
Cal. App. 2d 664, 205 P.2d 475, 476 (1949) (requiring the proprietor to have
"superior knowledge" of dangers); Fimple v. Archer Ballroom Co., 150 Neb.
681, 35 N.W.2d 680, 683 (1949) (holding operator of public amusement to
"stricter accountability for injuries to patrons than owners of private premises
generally ....
"); Tulsa Exposition & Fair Corp. v. Joyner, 208 Okla. 540, 257
P.2d 1077 (1953).
3. PROSSER, TORTS § 38 (2d ed. 1955);

RESTATEMENT,

TORTS §

348

(1934). The

rule was derived from the long established liability of common carriers for injuries to its passengers caused by third persons. 13 TExAs L. REv. 146 (1934).
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often entailed the duty of supervision by a sufficient number of attendants. 4 In application of these rules, patrons have recovered from
the proprietor of a place of amusement in numerous situations. For
example: When hit by a ball thrown by other patrons at a swimming pool,5 when injured at a roller rink by a visibly intoxicated
party,6 when pushed down a flight of stairs at a racetrack7 when set on
fire by another patron in a theater, 8 when struck by several boys play9
ing tag on skates in the lobby of a skating rink, and when hit in the
0
eye by a "spit ball" at a theater.
The principal case simply extends to a new factual situation this
duty of the landowner. In light of the above cases it seems that this
is not a new rule," but one which has been generally applied to operators of public amusements. The holding here appears to rely primarily
on the court's assumption that the defendant should know that when
people scramble for a foul ball some patron might be injured. This
was determined despite testimony that no person had previously been
injured in such a manner during the operation of the stadium by defendant. After requiring the defendant to anticipate such an injury,
the court focused its attention on the duty violated in not having ushers
*present, and hastily passed over any question of assumption of risk
on the part of the plaintiff.
It may seem inconsistent that one may be held to assume the risk
of being hit by a foul ball, 12 and yet not assume the risk of being
injured in a scramble for a ball. However, perhaps this inconsistency
might be better explained if considered from the standpoint of the
duty issue. According to Professor James, "the concept of assuming
the risk is purely duplicative of other more widely understood concepts, such as scope of duty . . . .It adds nothing to modern law
except confusion.' 3 In other words, to say that a plaintiff assumes
the risk in this type of situation is just another way of saying that
4. Antinucci v. Hellman, 5 App. Div. 2d 634, 174 N.Y.S.2d 343 (3d Dep't 1958);
Mears v. Kelley, 59 Ohio App. 159, 17 N.E.2d 386 (1938); Pfeifer v. Standard
Gateway Theater, Inc., 259 Wis. 333, 48 N.W.2d 505 (1951); Annot., 20 A.L.R.2d

-8,32 (1951).

5. Boardman v. Ottinger, 161 Ore. 202, 88 P.2d 967 (1939).
6. Martin v. Philadelphia Gardens, Inc., 348 Pa. 232, 35 A.2d 317 (1944).
7. Paranzino v. Yonkers Raceway, Inc., 9 Misc. 2d 378, 170 N.Y.S.2d 280 (Sup.
Ct., App. T. 1957).
8. Antinucci v. Hellman, 5 App. Div. 2d 634, 174 N.Y.S.2d 343 (3d Dep't 1958).
9. Johnson v. Amphitheatre Corp., 206 Minn. 282, 288 N.W. 386 (1939).
10. Pfeifer v. Standard Gateway Theater, Inc., 259 Wis. 333, 48 N.W.2d 505

(1951).
11. See cases commented on in 16 TENN.L. REV. 887 (1941); 13 TEXAS L. REV.
146 (1934); 12 U. DET. L.J.. 169 (1949).
12. Hunt v. Thomasville Baseball Co., 80 Ga. App. 572, 56 S.E.2d 828 (1949);
McNeil v. Fort Worth Baseball Club, 268 S.W.2d 244 (Tex. 1954); Hamilton v.
Salt Lake City Corp., 120 Utah 647, 237 P.2d 841 (1951).
13. James, Assumption of Risk, 61 YALE L.J. 141, 169 (1952).
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there was no duty to protect him from that risk.14 Apparently the court
in the instant case adopted this line of reasoning, and found that a
duty did exist. Thus, an anomalous situation is found in this area of
the law-a baseball club generally owes no duty to screen the entire
stadium to prevent one from being hit by a foul ball' 5 but may be held
liable to a patron injured in a scramble for such a ball.

RADIO AND TELEVISION-FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
ACT-IMPLIED IMMUNITY OF STATIONS FROM
SUITS FOR DEFAMATION
Defendant, a candidate in a primary election, made certain defamatory remarks concerning plaintiff over the co-defendant's radio
and television stations. Defendant candidate stated that the plaintiff
was a known communist' and that the Federal Communications Commission had revoked his licenses to operate radio and television stations.2 Several days prior to this broadcast the incumbent had made
a speech over the same stations, and, under the provisions of the Federal Communications Act a mandatory duty was imposed on the station
to grant all other candidates an equal opportunity to broadcast. In an
action for defamation against all defendants, there was a jury verdict
for plaintiff, and defendants moved to have this set aside on the
grounds that the act granted them implied immunity from such suits.
Held, motions sustained. The Federal Communications Act, by denying radio and television stations the right to censor political speeches,
impliedly grants such stations immunity from suit for defamation
arising from broadcasts of such speeches through their facilities by a
14. PROSSER, TORTS § 55 (2d ed. 1955).

15. Erickson v. Lexington Baseball Club, 233 N.C. 627, 65 S.E.2d 140 (1951);
Schentzel v. Philadelphia Nat'l League Club, 173 Pa. Super. 179, 96 A.2d 181
(1953). In weighing the magnitude of the harm against the utility of the
risk to determine the validity of this distinction, it would be pertinent to
observe that there have been quite a number of cases involving injury from
being hit by a batted ball and this appears to be the first case concerning serious injury resulting from the scramble for a ball. However, that screening
the entire stadium would be too great a duty even in light of the risk, see
Malone, Contributory Negligence and the Landowner Cases, 29 MnNN. L. REv.

61, 76-79 (1945).
1. See 55 Dicu. L. REV. 146 (1945), indicating that some jurisdictions hold
that calling a person a communist is slander per se. See also Solosko v. Paxton,
383 Pa. 419, 119 A.2d 230 (1956).
2. This action arose during a heated senatorial primary election in Tennessee between incumbent United States Senator Estes Kefauver and candidate
Pat Sutton. The defamatory remarks were made during a broadcast over
defendant stations WSM and WLAC, when Sutton, in response to a query
during the course of a "talkathon," stated that Kefauver supporter, Edward
Lamb, was a communist.
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qualified candidate for public office. Lamb v. Sutton, 164 F. Supp. 928
(M.D. Tenn. 1958).
The act provides that if any political candidate is granted broadcasting time, all other candidates must be granted equal time, and that
the station shall have no power of censorship over the material to be
broadcast by such candidates. 3 A basic problem is presented as to
whether the section of the act prohibiting censorship, by implication,
grants the station immunity from suit for any defamation, arising from
such uncensored material. The few cases that have been decided in
this field indicate that the status of the law is far from settled. 4 In
Sorensen v. Wood,5 the Nebraska Supreme Court, in construing the
Federal Radio Act 6 (the forerunner of the Federal Communications
Act), held a station liable on the theory that the Radio Act conferred
no immunity on stations who published defamation. 7 A contrary decision was rendered in Josephson v. Knickerbocker Broadcasting Co.8
There the station pleaded the prohibitory effect of the Federal Communications Act and was absolved of liability, the court reasoning that
since the statute limited censorship, it was only fair that the station
be protected from actions for defamation. 9 The state of the law was
further clouded by Houston Post Co. v. United States, which refused to
3. The Federal Communications Act states that: "(a) If any licensee shall
permit any person who is a legally qualified candidate for any public office to
use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal opportunities to all other such
candidates for that office in the use of such broadcasting station: Provided,
that such licensee shall have no power of censorship over the material broadcast under the provisions of this section. No obligation is imposed upon any
licensee to allow the use of its station by any such candidate." Federal Communications Act § 315, 48 Stat. 1088 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 315
(1952).
4. For a discussion of different interpretations of the act in such cases see
Leflar, Legal Liability for the Exercise of Free Speech, 10 ARK. L. REV. 155
(1956); Vold, Defamatory Interpolationsin Radio Broadcasts, 88 U. PA. L. REV.
249 (1940); Legislation, 30 ST. Jom'Ns L. REV. 133 (1955); Legislation, 25 FoRDHAm L. REV. 385 (1956); 36 N.C.L. REV.355 (1958); 36 B.U.L. REV. 137 (1956).
See also, PROSSER, TORTS §95 at 614 (2d ed. 1955).
5.123 Neb.348, 243 N.W.82 (1932).
6.The Federal Radio Act of 1927, 44 Stat. 1162, was the forerunner of the
Federal Communications Act and contained an identical censorship provision.
7. The defendant radio station was held liable for defamatory remarks concerning a candidate for re-election as attorney general. The defamatory words
were spoken by a political opponent of plaintiff who was in no way connected with the station. The station was held liable despite the restrictive provisions of the Federal Radio Act. 123 Neb. 348, 243 N.W. 82 (1932).
8. 38 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
9. "The fourth and fifth defenses plead qualified privileges under Section
315 of the Federal Communications Act, 48 Stat. 1088 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 315
(1952). This section prohibits discrimination among qualified candidates for
public office in the use of the facilities of a radio station (the basis of the
fifth defense) and denies a right of censorship to the radio station (the basis
of the fourth defense). The person who uttered the alleged defamatory matter
was such a candidate. Since this statute creates obligations and limitations,
it is proper that the owner of the radio station be given corresponding
qualified privileges against liability for statements which it has no power
to control. The defenses as pleaded are sufficient." 38 N.Y.S.2d at 985.
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give any weight to an opinion of the FCC that favored granting the
broadcaster immunity in such cases.10 The last decision in this field
prior to the instant case was Farmers Union v. WDAY, Inc." In finding for the station, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that the
act confers immunity from liability for defamatory remarks made by
2
a duly qualified candidate during a political broadcast.'
The court in the instant case took note of the fact that there is no
express provision in the act exempting a broadcaster from liability for
defamatory utterances of an office seeker. But in analyzing the text
and the history of the act, it was concluded that such immunity was
necessarily implied, inasmuch as the denial of censorship is complete. 13
The court reasoned that Congress could not have intended to expose
stations to the possibility of having defamatory remarks broadcast
through their facilities without exempting them from liability resulting
therefrom. 14 Also relied on was the opinion in Port Huron Broadcasting Co.'5 in which the FCC ruled that by the passage of the act
the federal governrient had exercised its rights of pre-emption and
that the station was relieved of responsibility, even though there were
state laws to the contrary. 16 It was considered as significant that since
this interpretation, Congress had not acted to modify either the act or
7
the aforementioned ruling.'
The fact that the two most recent cases have both granted the station immunity in such situations indicates that there may be developing a modern trend that will refuse to hold a station liable for publication of defamatory remarks of a political candidate. If immunity is
not granted under the act, stations are faced with the alternative of
permitting all candidates in a particular election to make uncensored
broadcasts, or to exclude campaign speeches altogether. Since the
latter course of action appears extremely undesirable, the better solution would seem to be a granting of immunity from suit to stations for
defamatory statements made during political broadcasts.
10. 79 F. Supp. 199 (S.D. Tex. 1948).
11. 89 N.W.2d 102 (N.D. 1958).

12. "We cannot believe that it was the intent of Congress to compel a station to broadcast libelous statements and at the same time subject it to the
risk of defending actions for damages." Id. at 109.
13. 164 F. Supp. at 932.
14. Ibid.
15. 12 F.C.C. 1069 (1948).
16. In the Port Huron case a station manager refused to allow a candidate
to broadcast after an examination of the script indicated that it contained
libelous material.
17. "The House amendment would further have added to the present law
a provision providing that the licensee should not be liable in any civil or
criminal action in any local, State, or Federal Court because of any material
in such a broadcast, except in cases where the licensee willfully, knowingly,
and with intent to defame, participated in the broadcast." The Senate defeated this proposed amendment. 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2263 (1952).

